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Abstract. Confirmation is a useful concept for assessing the impact of 
the premise on the conclusion of a rule induced from data. 
Interpretation of probabilistic relationships between premise and 
conclusion of a rule led to four mathematical formulations of 
confirmation, called perspectives. The logical equivalence of these 
perspectives and the resulting general definition of confirmation 
underline the known qualitative aspect of the concept of confirmation. 
The quantitative aspect of confirmation is handled by definitions of 
particular confirmation measures. In this paper, we relate the qualitative 
and quantitative aspects by introducing a property of monotonicity of 
measures with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities defining 
the perspectives. This new property permits consideration of 
confirmation measures in association with particular perspectives. We 
also identify several other properties that valuable confirmation 
measures should possess. A particular care is devoted to discussion of 
behavior of confirmation measures monotonic in different perspectives 
with respect to symmetry properties, taking also into account two new 
perspectives of Bayesian confirmation. We also prove that confirmation 
measures monotonic in the six perspectives are exhaustive in the sense 
that their set is closed under transformations related to symmetry 
properties. Finally, we verify which confirmation measures enjoy these 
properties. 
Keywords: Rule interestingness measures, Bayesian confirmation, 
Evidential support, Properties of measures 
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1. Introduction 
Confirmation is a term from philosophy of science, defined as the impact 
of evidence on hypothesis. For example, seeing a man with a bike helmet 
walk into an office can be regarded as a piece of evidence with a greater 
impact on a hypothesis that he came to work by bike than on a hypothesis that 
he came by car. The information concerning the support brought by a piece of 
evidence (observational data) to a hypothesis (scientific theory) is often 
needed in scientific research involving data analysis. Thus, naturally, 
philosophers of science and epistemologists have attempted to express first 
qualitatively, and finally quantitatively the relation between evidence and 
hypothesis. 
The concept of confirmation has to be distinguished from the measure of 
confirmation. The first acknowledges qualitatively three situations: 
confirmation, neutrality and disconfirmation. Confirmation takes place when 
for a given premise E and hypothesis H, the probability of H given E is 
greater than the probability of H (i.e., Pr(H|E) > Pr(H)). Neutrality holds when 
Pr(H|E) = Pr(H), and disconfirmation when Pr(H|E) < Pr(H) [12]. On the 
other hand, a confirmation measure quantifies the degree of support that a 
given evidence E brings to a hypothesis H. Values obtained by measures of 
confirmation can be positive, negative or zero, corresponding to situations of 
confirmation, disconfirmation or neutrality, respectively. 
In this article, we mainly concentrate on measures of confirmation for 
potential use in the field of data mining and knowledge discovery. In 
particular, we regard them as means for the evaluation of rule patterns 
induced from datasets, where the rule’s premise is seen as the evidence with 
an impact on the rule’s conclusion, i.e., the hypothesis. The evaluation of 
rules is a valid and necessary step in the data mining process allowing to filter 
out rules that are useless or irrelevant. It is commonly done using measures of 
interest such as confidence, support, etc. often neglecting the profits brought 
by the division of values of confirmation measures into positive, negative and 
zero (see [2], [15], [27], [28], [34] for a survey on measures of rule 
interestingness). Nevertheless, users are more and more commonly interested 
in evaluating rules with measures that reward the rules in which the premise 
confirms the conclusion. It is not completely clear, however, what it means 
that a premise confirms the conclusion. What does the confirmation stand for 
and how can we quantify it?  
In this article, we aim at answering the above questions by studying the 
concept of confirmation from different perspectives. These perspectives 
derive from logically equivalent formulations of the concept of Bayesian 
confirmation [12] and interpret in a probabilistic way relationships of 
confirmation type between premise and conclusion of a rule. Classically, four 
different perspectives, that we call Bayesian, likelihoodist, strong Bayesian, 
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and strong likelihoodist, have been considered in the literature (see, e.g., [12], 
[28]). In this paper, we take into account two new perspectives of Bayesian 
confirmation, called converse Bayesian and converse likelihoodist 
perspectives. Besides the six logically equivalent perspectives of 
confirmation, we recall a general definition of confirmation in terms of a 
contingency table rather than in terms of probabilities [16]. We stress the fact 
that the general definition of confirmation has the advantage of being always 
defined (as opposed to the other six perspectives that become undefined in 
certain conditions).  
While the six perspectives of confirmation underline the qualitative 
aspect of this concept, confirmation measures exhibit the quantitative aspect. 
We introduce an important link between the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of confirmation, which is the property of monotonicity of measures 
with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities defining the 
perspectives. In this way, we pass from consideration of six perspectives of 
confirmation to consideration of six classes of confirmation measures, each 
one monotonic in one of the six perspective. We prove that the confirmation 
measures monotonic in the six perspectives are exhaustive in the sense that 
their set is closed under transformations related to symmetry properties. 
We also identify several other properties that valuable confirmation 
measures should definitely possess. The properties are analyzed and described 
in detail providing an insight into many necessary modifications and 
improvements introduced into their formulation over the time. The set of 
valuable properties that emerged from our analysis contains:  
 property of monotonicity with respect to the number of objects 
satisfying the rule’s premise and/or conclusion (property M),  
 property assuring that rules for which there are no counterexamples 
and no objects supporting the conclusion but not the rule’s premise 
will obtain a higher value of a measure than rules for which such 
objects do exist in the dataset (weak Ex1 property),  
 property of weak logicality indicating the conditions under which 
measures should obtain their extreme values (weak L property), 
 three symmetry properties related to negation of the rule’s premise 
and/or conclusion:  
o evidence symmetry,  
o hypothesis symmetry and  
o evidence-hypothesis symmetry, being the combination of the 
two above symmetries.  
The four perspectives of confirmation were considered already in 
theoretical studies [11], [28], neglecting however practical consequences of 
their application in data mining. In practical applications, it is desirable to 
assess rule interestingness using measures normalized with respect to extreme 
situations encountered in data. It appears, however, that some strategies to 
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determining the extremes can lead to paradoxical rankings of rules. Thus, 
identifying which of them permits to avoid these paradoxes is a challenging 
task. In this paper, we undertake this task and show which of the four 
perspectives are the right starting points to define properties that confirmation 
measures should reasonably possess.  
This paper builds on results presented in [22], [23], where we showed for 
the first time some paradoxes resulting from adoption of a particular strategy 
to determining the extreme situations. Moreover, this article presents a holistic 
view on qualitative and quantitative aspects of the concept of confirmation. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents 
preliminaries on data, rules and their quantitative description. Next, in 
Section 3, four perspectives of confirmation are thoroughly discussed. Their 
logical equivalence is recalled along with a general definition of confirmation. 
We also introduce an important property of monotonicity of a measure with 
respect to the left- and right-hand side probabilities defining the four 
perspectives. This property will be shortly called “monotonicity of a measure 
in a perspective”. It associates confirmation measures with particular 
perspectives because, as proved in Section 3.2, a measure being strictly 
monotonic in one perspective is not strictly monotonic in other perspectives. 
Section 4 is devoted to properties of confirmation measures that are inspired 
by extreme values of confirmation. As it is shown, the strategy for 
determining the extreme confirmation inspired by the perspective of strong 
Bayesian confirmation has many practical advantages over entailment, and 
thus it should be used as a starting point for defining properties of measures. 
Consecutive subsections discuss properties already known in the literature as 
well as their modifications in the context of strong Bayesian confirmation. 
The relationship between particular properties and different perspectives of 
confirmation is also discussed. A particular care is devoted to discussion of 
behavior of confirmation measures monotonic in different perspectives with 
respect to symmetry properties. In this context, two new perspectives of 
Bayesian confirmation are introduced, showing also that together with the 
other four previous perspectives, they are exhaustive with respect to 
transformations of confirmation measure related to symmetry properties. 
Having established the list of desirable properties, analysis of selected 
measures with respect to the properties is carried out in Section 5. The paper 
ends with conclusions. All the proofs are deferred to an Appendix provided as 
on-line supplementary materials. 
2. Preliminaries about data, rules and supporting observations 
A dataset is composed of a number of observations, called objects, 
described by a number of variables. The objects constitute a universe U from 
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which rules are induced. Each rule is a consequence relation denoted by 
EH, read as “if E, then H”. It consists of a premise (evidence) E and a 
conclusion (hypothesis) H. In the context of a particular dataset, the relation 
between E and H may be quantified by four non-negative numbers a, b, c and 
d, corresponding to all possible cases of truth and falsity of E and H, 
presented in a 2 x 2 contingency table (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Contingency table of E and H for rule EH 
 H H ∑ 
E a c a+c 
E b d b+d 
∑ a+b c+d |U| 
Precisely, the number of all objects in U supporting both the premise and 
the conclusion of a rule is quantified by a; b reflects the number of objects for 
which the premise in not satisfied, but the conclusion is, etc. 
Using a, b, c and d is common and intuitive for data mining techniques 
since all observations are collected in an information table describing each 
object by a set of variables. However, a, b, c and d can also be used to 
estimate probabilities, e.g., Pr(E)=(a+c)/|U| or Pr(H)=(a+b)/|U|, 
Pr(H|E)=a/(a+c) (which, however, is only defined when a + c > 0). 
The notation based on a, b, c and d can be effectively used for defining 
such interestingness measures as confidence conf(H, E) = a/(a+c), support 
sup(H, E) = a, etc. Observe, that the domain of both confidence and support is 
non-negative, therefore they are unable to express disconfirmation and cannot 
be treated as measures of confirmation. The scale of confidence or support is 
not helpful for filtering out rules in which the rule’s premise has a negative 
impact on the rule’s conclusion. The profits from using confirmation 
measures, on the other hand, rest upon the scale showing immediately (by 
negative values) disconfirmatory rules. Among popular measures of 
confirmation there is measure D(H, E) = Pr(H|E)−Pr(H) = a/(a+c)−(a+b)/|U| 
defended among others in [7], measure 
N(H, E) = Pr(E|H)−Pr(E|H) = a/(a+b)−c/(c+d) supported by [33], or 
measure F(H, E) = [Pr(E|H)−Pr(E|H)]/[Pr(E|H)+Pr(E|H)]  
=(ad−bc)/(ad+bc+2ac) advocated for in [25]. Other interesting confirmation 
measures shall be presented in Section 5. 
3. Four perspectives of confirmation 
A common expectation with respect to the behavior of interestingness 
measures used for evaluation of rules is that they obtain: 
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 values > 0 when the premise of a rule confirms its conclusion, 
 values = 0 when the rule's premise and conclusion are neutral to 
each other, 
 values < 0 when the premise disconfirms the conclusion. 
Such requirements are referred to (informally) as the property of confirmation 
and thus, measures acting according to them are called confirmation 
measures. 
A commonly used definition of confirmation property, called Bayesian 
confirmation, requires that an interestingness measure c(H,E) satisfies the 
following conditions: 
 
(1)  
 
 
 
The property of Bayesian confirmation identifies confirmation with an 
increase in the probability of the conclusion provided by the premise, 
neutrality with the lack of influence of the premise on the probability of 
conclusion, and finally disconfirmation with a decrease of probability of the 
conclusion imposed by the premise [4]. In the literature [12], [28], such 
understanding of confirmation is sometimes also called incremental Bayesian 
confirmation, as opposed to the absolute confirmation which assumes that 
E confirms H, if some kind of a threshold k(0, 1) is surpassed by the 
conditional probability of H given E. This article however shall not cover the 
absolute confirmation. 
It is important to stress that the Bayesian confirmation is not the only 
definition of property of confirmation. In the literature (see [12], [28]), there 
are three other ways of expressing that E confirms H: 
 Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|E), 
 Pr(E|H) > Pr(E), 
 Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|H). 
This gives four perspectives in which confirmation can be considered. 
Below, we propose a way of systematizing them, pointing out the differences 
between them and recalling their logical equivalence. 
To better distinguish the perspectives of confirmation let us call them in 
the following way (for clarity of the presentation, in brackets we put only the 
conditions under which a measure should obtain positive values, as the 
conditions for neutrality and negative values are analogously formed): 
(i) Bayesian confirmation (Pr(H|E) > Pr(H)), 
(ii) strong Bayesian confirmation (Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|E)), 
(iii) likelihoodist confirmation (Pr(E|H) > Pr(E)), 
(iv) strong likelihoodist confirmation (Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|H)). 





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Those perspectives can be naturally grouped into couples reaching to the 
debate between Bayesians and likelihoodists about confirmation’s 
probabilistic interpretation [14]. Let us note that rule EH in the Bayesian 
viewpoint, corresponds to rule HE in the likelihoodist approach. 
All those four perspectives have different philosophical background and 
motivations. They emphasize different faces of confirmation: 
 the Bayesian confirmation states that E confirms H if H is more 
probable with E rather than without E, where “without E” means 
without knowing if E or E is true,  
 the strong Bayesian confirmation stresses that E confirms H if H is 
more probable with E rather than with E, 
 the likelihoodist confirmation says that E confirms H if E is more 
probable with H rather than without H, where “without H” means 
without knowing if H or H is true, 
 finally, the strong likelihoodist confirmation states that E confirms H 
if E is more probable with H rather than with H. 
To provide an interpretation of the four perspectives of confirmation let 
us use an illustrative example, in which the premise E is the evidence that a 
patient suffered from a fever and the conclusion H reflects that the patient had 
a flu. Then: 
 in case of Bayesian confirmation (i) if flu is more probable with fever 
rather than without knowing whether the fever occurred or not, then 
fever confirms flu, 
 in case of strong Bayesian confirmation (ii) if flu is more probable 
with fever rather than with no fever, than fever confirms flu, 
 in case of likelihoodist confirmation (iii) if fever is more probable 
with flu rather than without knowing whether the flu occurred of not, 
then fever confirms flu, 
 in case of strong likelihoodist confirmation (iv) if fever is more 
probable with flu rather than with no flu, then fever confirms flu. 
Let us stress that the difference between those four perspectives of 
confirmation does not only come from different philosophical backgrounds, 
motivations or interpretations. The particular formulations in terms of 
probabilities or frequencies involving a, b, c and d also result in differences 
with respect to undefined situations they may lead to.  
In particular, the perspective of Bayesian confirmation in terms of 
probabilities is formulated as Pr(H|E) > Pr(H), which can be estimated by the 
non-negative numbers as a/(a+c) > (a+b)/|U|. Clearly, such formulation 
requires that Pr(E) ≠ 0 (or more precisely Pr(E) > 0) or equivalently a+c ≠ 0 
(or more precisely a+c > 0). 
The perspective of strong Bayesian confirmation has even stronger 
requirements, since the formulation Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|E) (or equivalently 
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a/(a+c) > b/(b+d)) in order to be defined wants that Pr(E) ≠ 0 and Pr(E) ≠ 0 
(or equivalently a+c ≠ 0 and b+d ≠ 0). 
Analogous considerations for the perspectives of likelihoodist 
confirmation and strong likelihoodist confirmation lead to requiring that 
Pr(H) ≠ 0 (or equivalently a+b ≠ 0) or that Pr(H) ≠ 0 and Pr(H) ≠ 0 (or 
equivalently a+b ≠ 0 and c+d ≠ 0), respectively. 
Since the different perspectives are undefined in different situations (in 
different points of the four dimensional domain, i.e., domain based on a, b, c, 
d), they are not equivalent in general; they are different. For example, the 
perspective of strong Bayesian confirmation would result in an undefined 
value (analogous to an “I don’t know” answer) when b+d = 0, while at the 
same time the perspective of Bayesian confirmation could be defined, 
pointing out the situation of neutrality.  
3.1.  Logical equivalence of four perspectives of confirmation 
As the above introduction shows, the four perspectives of confirmation 
should be regarded as different, alternative ways of formalizing this concept. 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the four perspectives are logically 
equivalent, provided they do not lead to undefined values. By logical 
equivalence we understand that the conditions which need to be satisfied to 
switch between positive, zero and negative values are the same for all the 
perspectives. Thus, they are not the same, but they “switch” in the same 
situations, which we will demonstrate below. 
Let us observe that the situation of confirmation with respect to Bayesian 
confirmation is represented by the following inequality: Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). 
Using the non-negative numbers a, b, c and d, it can be expressed as 
a/(a+c) > (a+b)/|U| (of course, we require that a+c ≠ 0). Simple mathematical 
transformations show that a/(a+c) > (a+b)/|U| iff a|U| > (a+b)(a+c), which can 
be further simplified to ad-bc > 0. Thus, provided that Bayesian confirmation 
is defined (i.e., a+c ≠ 0), the ad−bc{>,=,<}0 are the conditions for switching 
between situation of confirmation, neutrality and disconfirmation, 
respectively. 
Regarding the strong Bayesian confirmation, the situation of 
confirmation is represented as Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|E), which can be also 
expressed as a/(a+c) > b/(b+d) (of course, we require that a+c ≠ 0 and 
b+d ≠ 0). Simple mathematical transformations show that a/(a+c) > b/(b+d) 
iff a(b+d) > b(a+c), which can be further simplified to ad-bc > 0. Thus, 
provided that the definition of the strong Bayesian confirmation is defined 
(i.e., a+c ≠ 0 and b+d ≠ 0), ad−bc{>,=,<}0 are the conditions for switching 
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between situation of confirmation, neutrality and disconfirmation, 
respectively. 
Analogous transformations can be performed for likelihoodist and strong 
likelihoodist confirmations, showing that again the  
ad−bc{>,=,<}0 are the conditions for switching between situation of 
confirmation, neutrality and disconfirmation, respectively. 
Summing up, one can formulate a general conclusion, that there are four 
(i) - (iv) alternative, different perspectives of confirmation, but, provided they 
are defined, they all boil down to the following general definition of 
confirmation expressed in terms of the non-negative a, b, c and d, as in [22] 
(page 5) and [16] (Proposition 1):  
 
 
(2)  
 
 
 
Coming back to the interpretation of a, b, c, d in terms of probabilities, (2) is 
equivalent to: 
 
 
(3)  
 
 
 
 
The logical equivalence of Bayesian confirmation, strong Bayesian 
confirmation, likelihoodist confirmation and strong likelihoodist confirmation 
with the “ad−bc” formulation is true provided that none of the (i)-(iv) 
formulations is undefined, which means that all the following sums: a+c, b+d, 
a+b and c+d are non-zero. 
The above general definition of confirmation has the advantage over the 
(i)-(iv) perspectives of never being undefined. The fact that there is no 
denominator in it, guarantees that for any dataset, and thus any particular 
contingency table with a, b, c and d, definition (2) determines whether we are 
in the situation of confirmation, neutrality of disconfirmation. On the other 
hand, working with Bayesian confirmation, strong Bayesian confirmation, 
likelihoodist confirmation or strong likelihoodist confirmation we can also 
obtain the undesirable undefined situations (when a+c =0, or b+d = 0, or 
a+b = 0, or c+d = 0). 
What makes the matter even worse, is that the four perspectives are 
undefined in different situations, i.e., one perspective can be undefined while 
the other can be defined. This could be definitely confusing for practitioners 
who expect a clear answer: confirmation, neutrality or disconfirmation in the 
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whole domain. The general definition of confirmation is always defined and 
provides the neutral answer whenever undefined situations occur for the other 
perspectives, i.e., when a+c = 0, or b+d = 0, or a+b = 0, or c+d = 0. For 
example, in case when a+c = 0, we can conclude that a =c = 0 (since all 
values a, b, c, d  are assumed to be non-negative), which boils the formula 
ad−bc to zero expressing the neutrality. The general definition of 
confirmation is thus a kind of brace for the other formulations that can be 
especially useful when working with real life data sets. 
3.2. Desirable property of monotonicity of confirmation 
measures with respect to left- and right-hand side 
probabilities of the four perspectives of confirmation 
The four logically equivalent perspectives of confirmation suggest four kinds 
of monotonicity for confirmation measures. In fact, 
 Bayesian confirmation (Pr(H|E) > Pr(H)) suggests that a 
confirmation measure c(H|E) should be non-decreasing with 
respect to Pr(H|E) and non-increasing with Pr(H), 
 strong Bayesian confirmation (Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|E)) suggests that a 
confirmation measure c(H|E) should be non-decreasing with 
respect to Pr(H|E) and non-increasing with Pr(H|E), 
 likelihoodist confirmation (Pr(E|H) > Pr(E)) suggests that a 
confirmation measure c(H|E) should be non-decreasing with 
respect to Pr(E|H) and non-increasing with Pr(E), 
 strong likelihoodist confirmation (Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|H)) suggests 
that a confirmation measure c(H|E) should be non-decreasing with 
respect to Pr(E|H) and non-increasing with Pr(E|H). 
Indeed, in all these perspectives, one can switch from a situation of 
disconfirmation to a situation of confirmation if the left-hand side probability 
increases (while the right-hand side probability does not increase) or the right-
hand side probability decreases (while the left-hand side probability does not 
decrease). It is thus reasonable to require that the increase of the left-hand side 
probability or decrease of the right-hand side probability should not decrease 
the confirmation c(H,E) that quantifies the support that evidence E gives to 
hypothesis H.  
Coming back to the example where the premise E is the evidence that a 
patient has a fever, and the conclusion H is the hypothesis that the patient has 
a flu, we can say that for a confirmation measure 
 being monotonic with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities 
of the Bayesian perspective, the greater the probability of flu in case of 
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fever, and the smaller the probability of flu, the more the fever confirms 
the flu,  
 being monotonic with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities 
of the strong Bayesian perspective, the greater the probability of flu in 
case of fever, and the smaller the probability of flu in case of no fever, 
the more the fever confirms the flu, 
 being monotonic with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities 
of the likelihoodist perspective, the greater the probability of fever in 
case of flu, and the smaller the probability of fever, the more the fever 
confirms the flu, 
 being monotonic with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities 
of the strong likelihoodist perspective, the greater the probability of 
fever in case of flu, and the smaller the probability of fever in case of 
no flu, the more the fever confirms the flu. 
A formal definition of the monotonicity of a measure with respect to left- 
and right-hand side probabilities of particular perspective, is as follows. 
 
Definition 1. A confirmation measure c(H,E) is monotonic with respect to 
left- and right-hand side probabilities of a particular perspective if, taking into 
account left- and right-hand side probabilities of the perspective, there exists 
f:[0,1]×[0,1]→ non-decreasing with the first argument and non-increasing 
with the second argument, with f(x,x) = 0 for all x[0,1], such that 
c(H,E) = f(PrL, PrR) where PrL is the left-hand side probability and PrR is the 
right-hand side probability of the considered perspective.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, instead of writing that a particular confirmation 
measure is monotonic with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities of 
a given perspective we will shortly write that a particular confirmation 
measure is monotonic in a given perspective.  
Examples of typical confirmation measures monotonic in particular 
perspectives include: 
 a measure monotonic in the Bayesian perspective:  
D(H, E) = Pr(H|E)−Pr(H) = a/(a+c)−(a+b)/|U|, 
 a measure monotonic in the strong Bayesian perspective:  
S(H, E) = Pr(H|E)−Pr(H|E) = a/(a+c)−b/(a+b), 
 a measure monotonic in the likelihoodist perspective:  
M(H, E) = Pr(E|H)−Pr(E) = a/(a+b)−(a+c)/|U|, 
 a measure monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective: 
N(H, E) = Pr(E|H)−Pr(E|H) = a/(a+b)−c/(c+d). 
 
Consider now a rule EH in two scenarios for which the values of a, b, c 
and d can change (e.g., some objects regarded as counterexamples in 
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scenario 1 are regarded as positive examples in scenario 2). The two scenarios 
correspond to contingency tables in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
Table 2. Contingency table for scenario 1 
 H1 H1 ∑ 
E1 a1=10 c1=2 a1+c1=12 
E1 b1=10 d1=78 b1+d1=88 
∑ a1+b1=20 c1+d1=80 |U|=100 
Table 3. Contingency table for scenario 2 
 H2 H2 ∑ 
E2 a2=6 c2=1 a2+c2=7 
E2 b2=13 d2=80 b2+d2=93 
∑ a2+b2=19 c2+d2=81 |U|=100 
 
Observe that  
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Thus, by definition, for any confirmation measure monotonic in the 
Bayesian perspective we get c(H2,E2) ≥ c(H1,E1), since Pr(H|E) increased and 
Pr(H) decreased, while passing from scenario 1 to scenario 2.  
Indeed, we get D(H1,E1) = 0.633 and D(H2,E2) = 0.667 so clearly 
D(H2,E2) > D(H1,E1). However considering the other three confirmation 
measures given above we get:  
 S(H1,E1) = 0.720 and S(H2,E2) = 0.717   
so that S(H2,E2) < S(H1,E1); 
 M(H1,E1) = 0.38 and M(H2,E2) = 0.246   
so that M(H2,E2) < M(H1,E1); 
 N(H1,E1) = 0.475 and N(H2,E2) = 0.303  
so that N(H2,E2) < N(H1,E1). 
This shows that confirmation measures S(H,E), M(H,E) and N(H,E) are not 
monotonic in the Bayesian perspective.  
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Similar examples can be built to prove that D(H,E), M(H,E) and N(H,E) 
are not monotonic in the strong Bayesian perspective, D(H,E), S(H,E) and 
N(H,E) are not monotonic in the likelihoodist perspective and D(H,E), S(H,E) 
and M(H,E) are not monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective.  
In the following theorem, we will show that the observation obtained 
above for particular measures is more general, provided we assume strict 
monotonicity with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities defining a 
perspective of confirmation (i.e., strict monotonicity of a measure in a 
perspective of confirmation). See the Appendix for the proofs of all Theorems 
and Lemmas. The Appendix is provided as the on-line supplementary 
materials.  
 
Theorem 1. A confirmation measure being strictly monotonic in a given 
perspective, c(H,E) = f(PrL, PrR) with f  being strictly increasing in the first 
argument and strictly decreasing in the second argument, is not strictly 
monotonic in the other perspectives.  
3.3. Desirable property of monotonicity of confirmation 
measures with respect to left- and right-hand side 
probabilities of the general definition of confirmation 
Finally, let us also consider the monotonicity of a confirmation measure with 
respect to the left- and right-hand side probabilities for the general definition 
of confirmation. In case of the general definition of confirmation (3), there are 
four probabilities – two on the left-hand side and two on the right-hand side. 
Then, one can switch from a situation of disconfirmation to a situation of 
confirmation if the product on the left-hand side increases or the product on 
the right-hand side decreases. It is thus reasonable again to require that the 
increase of the left-hand side product or decrease of the right-hand side 
product should not decrease the confirmation c(H,E) that quantifies the 
support that evidence E gives to hypothesis H. Confirmation measures 
satisfying such requirement shall be regarded as monotonic in the general 
definition of confirmation. Later, in Section 4.1, we show that such 
monotonicity of measures in the general definition of confirmation boils down 
to the property of monotonicity M. 
On the basis of above discussion on monotonicity of confirmation 
measures in different perspectives of confirmation (Section 3.2), it is very 
appealing to define a confirmation measure f(a, b, c, d) monotonic in the 
general definition of confirmation. The simplest measures of this type would 
have the form: 
fbasic(a,b,c,d) = adbc.  
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Observe also that a very reasonable property one could expect from a 
function f(a,b,c,d) is its homogeneity of degree 0 which means that if all 
arguments of f are multiplied by a positive constant λ, then its value should 
not change, i.e.,  
f(λa,λb,λc,λd) = f(a,b,c,d). 
This means that the confirmation should depend on the proportion of the 
elements in the classes of the different combinations of truth and falsity of E 
and H and not on their absolute values. Indeed, taking λ = 1/|U|, we have  
 
 
 
 
 
Observe that the confirmation measure fbasic(a,b,c,d)  = ad−bc does not 
satisfy the property of homogeneity of degree 0. To get this result one could 
“normalize” the quantity. Many association indices follow this logic, such as 
the Pearson Phi index [36], [44]: 
 
 
 
 
or the Yule Q index [43]:  
 
 
 
Both the two above indices, however, have the disadvantage of not being 
defined for some values of their arguments because the denominator is null.  
To avoid this, one could consider some normalization of the quantity 
ad−bc for which the denominator is always different from zero. This is the 
case of the Michael coefficient of association [30]: 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, computing partial derivatives with respect to its arguments 
one can see that this measure does not respect monotonicity M introduced in 
[18] and discussed in the next Section 4.1, i.e., it is not non-decreasing with 
respect to a and d and non-increasing with respect to b and c in the whole 
domain and thus, strictly speaking, it cannot be considered a measure 
monotonic in the general definition of confirmation. On the contrary, the 
Pearson Phi index and the Yule Q index respect monotonicity of a, b, c and d 
in the whole domain. Thus, an interesting problem remains open: is there a 
confirmation measure obtained by normalizing the quantity ad−bc that is 
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defined in the whole domain (in the sense that the denominator is never null) 
and that respects the monotonicity of a, b, c and d in the whole domain?  
4. Properties of confirmation measures inspired by extreme values 
of confirmation 
To handle the plurality of confirmation measures, various properties have 
been defined and studied (e.g., [4], [7], [15], [18], [40], [42]). Measures 
possessing them are regarded as responding to the user’s expectations and 
thus are more useful in practical applications. Many properties proposed in the 
literature concern cases in which measures should obtain their extreme values 
(e.g., [6], [7], [12]) in result of acquiring knowledge about E for the 
conclusion H. Intuitively, an extreme value of confirmation occurs in case of 
logical entailment of the conclusion H by the premise E, i.e., when E |= H. 
This means that when Pr(H|E) = 1, i.e., when there are no counterexamples to 
the evaluated rule (c = 0), the value of a confirmation measure is expected to 
be extreme. Such a strategy is applied for properties Ex1, logicality, or in 
discussions about symmetry properties, when it is argued that a rule “if a 
drawn card is a Jack, then it is a face card” is a conclusively confirmatory 
rule, and thus “100% confirmatory” [6], [7], [12]. 
However, an important question that we need to ask is whether such a 
dependence of maximal confirmation only on Pr(H|E) is sufficient for 
defining desirable properties of measures. In fact, during the rule evaluation 
we are interested in finding out how much brings E to our knowledge about 
H. Thus, we need some kind of reference to H itself. Let us consider the two 
scenarios described in Table 4. 
Table 4. Contingency tables for scenario 3 and 4 
 H3 H3 ∑ 
E3 a3=100 c3=0 a3+c3=100 
E3 b3=99 d3=1 b3+d3=100 
∑ a3+b3=199 c3+d3=1 |U|=200 
    
 H4 H4 ∑ 
E4 a4=99 c4=1 a4+c4=100 
E4 b4=0 d4=100 b4+d4=100 
∑ a4+b4=99 c4+d4=101 |U|=200 
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In the case of scenario 3, the value of confirmation is thought to be extreme as 
there are no counterexamples: c3 = 0 and Pr(H3|E3) = 1 (we have entailment). 
The number of objects supporting H3 is very large in scenario 3; the 
conclusion H3 could be regarded as a majority class in a highly imbalanced 
dataset. In scenario 3, Pr(H3) = 199/200, we can thus conclude that knowing 
that the premise E3 occurred does not bring much to our knowledge about H3. 
On the other hand, in case of scenario 4 we have one counterexample (c4 = 1) 
and we cannot conclude that we have entailment (Pr(H4|E4) < 1). However, 
the premise has brought more to our knowledge about the conclusion in 
scenario 4 rather than in scenario 3. Thus, the strategy based on using the 
entailment in order to distinguish situations when confirmation should be 
extreme is not the best choice. 
In the light of the above observation, let us now exploit a strategy inspired 
by the formulation of strong Bayesian confirmation instead (analogical 
considerations can be carried out for the strong likelihoodist perspective). 
Strong Bayesian confirmation has already proved to bring satisfactory results 
in such areas of research as computer science [3], [18] or applications of 
computer science in pharmacy and chemistry [35]. It is an alternative, 
logically equivalent formulation of the property of confirmation, based on 
relation between two probabilities: Pr(H|E) = a/(a+c) and Pr(H|E) = b/(b+d). 
Let us remind, that for a given rule EH, an interestingness measure defined 
according to the strong Bayesian confirmation perspective should express the 
credibility of the following proposition: H is satisfied more frequently when E 
is satisfied, rather than when E is satisfied. Such formulation allows us to 
determine the most beneficial passing from Pr(H|E) to Pr(H|E) due to E, 
which, according to our strategy, should be regarded as the extreme strong 
Bayesian confirmation. When Pr(H|E) = 0 (i.e., when b = 0) and Pr(H|E) = 1 
(i.e., when c = 0) we gain most profits on knowledge about H from occurrence 
of E, instead of E. Thus, we postulate to associate the maximum of 
confirmation with the situations when b = c = 0 and thus exploit the strategy 
inspired by the strong Bayesian confirmation instead of the strategy inspired 
by the entailment, when defining desirable properties of confirmation 
measures. Let us note, moreover, that using strong Bayesian confirmation we 
are also in track with the general definition of confirmation, as it assumes that 
the confirmation has the chance of being extreme when b = c = 0. 
In the spirit of this section, let us observe that also for confirmation 
measures monotonic in the general definition of confirmation, maximal 
confirmation should be reached when b = c = 0. However, differently from the 
strong Bayesian confirmation, for the value of such measures the proportion 
between a and d also plays a role. Therefore it would be reasonable to assign 
the maximum value of confirmation when the product ad is maximal under 
fixed cardinality of the universe U. This is obtained in case a = d = |U|/2, in 
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which case ad = |U|2/4. Of course, symmetrically, the minimum value should 
be assigned when the product bc is maximal under fixed cardinality of the 
universe U, which is the case when b = c = |U|/2, in which case bc = |U|2/4. 
This is the case of the above mentioned Michael coefficient of association, as 
well as of a confirmation measure obtained putting this maximal value at the 
denominator of the value ad−bc, that is 
 
 
 
Let us observe that this formulation corresponds to confirmation measure 
C(H,E) [4] (see also Section 5) as 4C(H,E)=fnormalized(a,b,c,d). Unfortunately, 
calculating the partial derivatives with respect to a ,b, c and d one can see that 
also this measure is not non-decreasing with respect to a and d and non-
increasing with respect to b and c. Thus, it does not permit to give a positive 
answer to the question whether there exists a confirmation measure obtained 
normalizing the quantity ad−bc that is defined in the whole domain (in the 
sense that the denominator is never null) and that is monotonic in the general 
definition of confirmation, as well as respects the monotonicity M (see 
Section 4.1) with respect to a, b, c and d in the whole domain.  
Previous considerations about properties of confirmation measures by 
authors like Eells and Fitelson [7], Fitelson [12], [13], Crupi, Tentori and 
Gonzalez [6] have been based on the understanding of Bayesian confirmation 
as a generalization of logical entailment, and on the assumption that 
entailment of H by E should be followed by extreme confirmation. Their 
propositions of properties, including symmetry properties, Ex1 and logicality 
L, represent a strategy inspired by the entailment. Below, we discuss a 
number of desirable properties based on the proposed strategy inspired by the 
strong Bayesian confirmation perspective. Some of them are modifications of 
properties based on those related to entailment. 
4.1. Property of monotonicity M 
Greco, Pawlak and Słowiński have considered in [18] confirmation measures 
with respect to their usefulness for evaluation of decision rules. According to 
[18], a measure should enjoy a property, called property of monotonicity M. 
Formally, a confirmation measure c(H,E)=f(a,b,c,d) has the property M if and 
only if it is a function: 
 non-decreasing with respect to a, and  
 non-increasing with respect to b, and 
 non-increasing with respect to c, and  
 non-decreasing with respect to d. 
.
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The property M with respect to a (or, analogously, with respect to d) means 
that any evidence in which the premise E and the conclusion H (or, 
analogously, E and H) hold together does not decrease the confirmation of 
the rule EH. On the other hand, the property M with respect to b (or, 
analogously, with respect to c) means that any evidence in which E and H 
holds (or, analogously, E and H hold) does not increase the confirmation of 
the rule EH. 
Let us observe that such formulation of the property of monotonicity M 
reflects the monotonicity in the strong Bayesian perspective, the strong 
likelihoodist perspective as well as the general definition of confirmation (2). 
Since the strong Bayesian confirmation is based on Pr(H|E) = a/(a+c) and 
Pr(H|E) = b/(b+d), naturally, the increase in a and d accompanied by a 
decrease in b and c widens the difference between Pr(H|E) and Pr(H|E), 
making the first bigger and the latter smaller in value. With respect to the 
strong likelihoodist  confirmation, let us recall that it is based on 
Pr(E|H) = a/(a+b) and Pr(E|H) = c/(c+d), so that the increase in a and d 
accompanied by a decrease in b and c widens the difference between 
Pr(E|H) and Pr(E|H), making the first bigger and the latter smaller in value. 
Finally, for the general definition of confirmation, the increase in a and d 
accompanied by a decrease in b and c makes the value of adbc larger, and 
thus reflecting a greater confirmation. Following only the situation of 
entailment, we would only demand an increase in a and a decrease in c, which 
would erroneously limit the analysis.  
Let us also observe that, in general, a confirmation measure monotonic in 
the Bayesian perspective or in the likelihoodist perspective does not satisfy 
the monotonicity M. To show this, let us take into account an example already 
given in [18] and consider the scenarios 5 and 6 described in Table 5. 
Table 5. Contingency tables for scenario 5 and 6 
 H5 H5 ∑ 
E5 a5=100 c5=0 a5+c5=100 
E5 b5=0 d5=1 b5+d5=1 
∑ a5+b5=100 c5+d5=1 |U|=101 
    
 H6 H6 ∑ 
E6 a6=101 c6=0 a6+c6=101 
E6 b6=0 d6=1 b6+d6=1 
∑ a6+b6=101 c6+d6=1 |U|=102 
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Measuring confirmation in scenario 5 and scenario 6 with confirmation 
measure D(H,E) being monotonic in the Bayesian perspective, we get  
D(H5,E5)=
101
100
1  
102
101
1 = D(H6,E6), 
Thus, an increase in a (from a5 = 100 to a6 = 101) results in a decrease of the 
confirmation measure D(H,E) and therefore D(H,E) does not satisfy the 
property of monotonicity M. 
Analogously, measuring confirmation in scenario 5 and scenario 6 with 
confirmation measure M(H,E) being monotonic in the likelihoodist 
perspective, we get  
M(H5,E5)=
101
100
1  
102
101
1 = M(H6,E6), 
Again, an increase in a (from a5 = 100 to a6 = 101) results in a decrease of the 
confirmation measure M(H,E) and therefore M(H,E) does not satisfy the 
property of monotonicity M. 
Thus, in general, measures monotonic with respect to left- and right-hand 
side probabilities of the Bayesian perspective (e.g., D(H,E)) or the 
likelihoodist perspective (e.g., M(H,E)) do not satisfy the property of 
monotonicity M.  
Observe, however, that it is possible to have a confirmation measure 
monotonic in the Bayesian perspective, and satisfying monotonicity M. This 
is the case of the following measure Z(H,E) proposed by Crupi et al. [6]: 
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Indeed, as one can verify by calculating partial derivatives, measure Z(H,E) is 
strictly increasing with respect to Pr(H|E) and strictly decreasing with respect 
to Pr(H), and therefore it is monotonic in the Bayesian perspective. Moreover, 
Z(H,E) respects monotonicity M, as proved in [19].  
It is also possible to have a confirmation measure monotonic in the 
likelihoodist perspective, and satisfying monotonicity M. This is the case of 
the following measure V(H,E) that can be obtained from Z(H,E) by putting 
V(H,E)=Z(E,H), that is: 
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One can verify by calculating partial derivatives, that V(H,E) is strictly 
increasing with respect to Pr(E|H) and strictly decreasing with respect to 
Pr(E), and therefore it is monotonic in the likelihoodist perspective.  
Moreover, V(H,E) respects monotonicity M (see the proof of 
Observation 1 in the Appendix).  
 
We can synthesize all this discussion in the following statement. 
 
Proposition 1. Confirmation measures monotonic in the strong Bayesian or in 
the strong likelihoodist perspectives always satisfy the property of 
monotonicity M, while confirmation measures monotonic in the Bayesian or 
in the likelihoodist perspectives may satisfy monotonicity M (i.e., there exist 
confirmation measures monotonic in the Bayesian or in the likelihoodist 
perspectives that satisfy monotonicity M as well as those that do not satisfy 
it).   
4.2. Weak Ex1 property 
The weak Ex1 property introduced in [22] is a generalization of Ex1 property 
introduced by Crupi et al. in [6]. The original Ex1 property has been 
introduced as a requirement for confirmation being a generalization of logical 
entailment, however as such, it does not really work well in the context of rule 
evaluation by interestingness measures (see [22] and [16], followed by [17]). 
As we have argued earlier on, the entailment should rather be substituted with 
strategy inspired by strong Bayesian perspective. In this light, the substitution 
of original Ex1 property by weak Ex1 was proposed. It is recalled below. 
On the basis of classical deductive logic Crupi et al. [6] constructed a 
function v: 
 
 
Function v is such that it ascribes the same positive value (e.g., +1) to any 
argument (H, E) if and only if the rule’s premise E entails the conclusion H 
(i.e., E |= H). If E refutes H (i.e., E |= H) then the same value but of opposite 
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sign (e.g., 1) is ascribed. On the other hand, when the premise is not 
conclusively confirmatory nor conclusively disconfirmatory for the 
conclusion, then function v defaults to 0. Using function v, the original Ex1 
property is defined as follows: 
 
 
As we have observed in [22] such formulation of Ex1 implies that if a 
confirmation measure c(H,E) reaches its maximal value, then there are no 
counterexamples to the rule, i.e., E entails H, and if c(H,E) reaches its 
minimal value, then there are no positive examples to the rule, i.e., E 
entails H. Nevertheless, it is still possible that c = 0 and c(H,E) does not 
obtain its maximal value, as well as, it is possible that a=0 and c(H,E) does 
not get its minimal value. 
One can observe that Ex1 is a desirable property for confirmation measures 
c(H,E) interpreted as generalization of logical entailment E |= H. Moreover, it 
makes sense to consider disconfirmation as generalization of the entailment 
E |= H, which leads to the following new property called Ex1’:  
 
 
 
In [22], another property was introduced, called weak Ex1: 
 
 
 
 
Notice that the antecedent of property weak Ex1 is the conjunction of the 
antecedents of Ex1 and Ex1’, while the consequent is the same for all three 
properties. Property Ex1 says that c(H,E) cannot attain its maximum 
(minimum) value unless E |= H (E |= H), i.e., c=0 (a=0). Analogously, 
property Ex1’ says that c(H,E) cannot attain its maximum (minimum) value 
unless E |= H (E |= H), i.e., b=0 (d=0). Interpretation of property weak 
Ex1 is formulated in the following theorem.  
 
Theorem 2. Under weak Ex1, confirmation measure c(H,E) cannot attain its 
maximum value unless E |= H or E |= H, i.e., c=0 or b=0. Confirmation 
measure c(H,E) satisfying weak Ex1 cannot attain its minimum value unless 
E |= H or E |=H, i.e., a=0 or d=0.  
 
It should be noted that the above formulation and interpretation of weak 
Ex1 corrects those given without proof in [22] and [23]. 
),(),(  then   ,),(),( if 22112211 EHcEHcEHvEHv 
),(),(  then   ,),(),( if 22112211 EHcEHcEHvEHv 
).,(),(then   
  ,),(),(  and  ),(),( if
2211
22112211
EHcEHc
EHvEHvEHvEHv


 22 
Notice moreover that a confirmation measure satisfying Ex1 or Ex1’ 
satisfies also weak Ex1. Indeed, for confirmation measure c(H,E) satisfying 
Ex1, condition v(H1,E1)>v(H2,E2) is sufficient for c(H1,E1)>c(H2,E2), which 
continues to hold if, moreover, v(H1,E1)<v(H2,E2), which amounts to weak 
Ex1. Analogous proof holds for Ex1’. One can observe, however, that the 
opposite claim is not true. Take, for example, confirmation measure [5]: 
𝑆(𝐻, 𝐸) = 𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐸) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐻|¬𝐸) =
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑐
−
𝑏
𝑏 + 𝑑
. 
Obviously, the maximum value of S(H,E) is 1, which is attained when c=0 
and b=0 (measure S(H,E) satisfies weak Ex1). When c=0, but b>0, then 
S(H,E)<1, thus Ex1 does not hold. Analogously, when b=0, but c>0, then also 
S(H,E)<1, thus Ex1’ does not hold as well.  
Observe that one can also consider the following likelihoodist counterpart 
of weak Ex1 property, that we call weak L-Ex1 property: 
 
 
 
 
The following result is the counterpart of Theorem 2 with respect to weak 
L-Ex1 property.  
 
Theorem 3. Under weak L-Ex1, confirmation measure c(H,E) cannot attain 
its maximum value unless H |= E or H |= E, i.e., b=0 or c=0. Confirmation 
measure c(H,E) satisfying weak L-Ex1 cannot attain its minimum value unless 
H |= E or H |=E, i.e., a=0 or d=0.   
 
The following result shows the intimate relations between weak Ex1 
property and confirmation measures monotonic in the strong Bayesian 
perspective on one hand and weak L-Ex1 property and confirmation measures 
monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective on the other hand.  
 
Theorem 4. Confirmation measures strictly monotonic in the strong 
Bayesian perspective satisfy weak Ex1 property. Confirmation measures 
strictly monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective satisfy weak L-Ex1 
property.  
4.3. Weak L property 
Closely related to Ex1, Ex1’ and weak Ex1 properties are properties L (also 
known as logicality) [6], [16], and weak L [22], [23], and 
maximality/minimality [17]. The original L property (similarly to Ex1 
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property) was inspired by understanding confirmation as a generalization of 
logical entailment. Precisely, property L says that: 
 if E |= H (equivalently, if c = 0), then c(H,E) attains its maximum 
value, and 
 if E |= H (equivalently, if a = 0), then c(H,E) attains its minimum 
value. 
 
A complementary property to L would be the following new 
property L’: 
 if E |= H (equivalently, if b = 0), then c(E,H) attains its maximum 
value, and  
 if E |= H (equivalently, if d = 0),  then c(E,H) attains its minimum 
value. 
 
In [22], another property was introduced, called weak L assuring that: 
 if E |= H and E |= H, or equivalently when c = b = 0, then c(H, E) 
is maximal and 
 if E |= H and E |= H, or equivalently when a=d=0, then c(H, E) is 
minimal. 
 
Notice that the antecedent of property weak L is the conjunction of the 
antecedents of L and L’, while the consequent is the same for all three 
properties.  
Observe that, the formulation of weak L property is closely related to the 
formulation of strong Bayesian confirmation as it associates the maximum 
value to c(E,H) when Pr(H|E) = a/(a+c) =1 and Pr(H|E) = b/(b+d) = 0, as 
well as it associates the minimum value to c(E,H) when Pr(H|E) = a/(a+c) =0 
and Pr(H|E) = b/(b+d) = 1. 
Close to weak Ex1 and weak L properties is also the 
maximality/minimality requirement proposed by Glass in [16], [17], stating 
that: 
 c(H, E) should be maximal if and only if b = c = 0 and 
 c(H, E) should be minimal if and only if a = d = 0,  
provided that c(H, E) is defined.  
 
Theorem 5. Confirmation measures monotonic in the strong Bayesian 
perspective and measures monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective 
satisfy weak L property. Confirmation measures strictly monotonic in the 
strong Bayesian perspective, as well as confirmation measures strictly 
monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective, satisfy 
maximality/minimality.   
 24 
 
4.4. Symmetry properties 
Among widely considered properties for confirmation measures there is also a 
group of symmetry properties. Different authors are however not unanimous 
as to which particular symmetries are desirable. 
Inspired by the work of Carnap [4], Eells and Fitelson have investigated 
in [7] the following four properties of symmetry: 
 inversion (commutativity) symmetry IS:  c(H, E) = c(E, H), 
 evidence symmetry ES:  c(H, E) = c(H, E), 
 hypothesis symmetry HS:  c(H, E) = c(H, E), 
 evidence-hypothesis (total) symmetry EHS:  c(H, E) = c(H, E). 
Eells and Fitelson concluded in [7] that, in fact, only hypothesis symmetry HS 
is a desirable property, while evidence symmetry ES, commutativity 
symmetry IS and total symmetry EHS are not. Such symmetry requirements 
are also seen as favorable by Glass in [16].  
In their work [6], Crupi et at. have revised the symmetries considered by 
Eells and Fitelson in [7] and proposed to widen the analysis of symmetry 
properties. As a result, they investigated 7 symmetries (their analysis was 
conducted first for the situation of confirmation and then for that of 
disconfirmation) being all combinations obtained by negation and/or 
inversion of the premise E and the hypothesis H: 
 ES:  c(H, E) = c(H, E),   
 HS:  c(H, E) = c(H, E),   
 EIS:  c(H, E) = c(E, H),   
 HIS:  c(H, E) = c(E, H),   
 IS:  c(H, E) = c(E, H),   
 EHS:  c(H, E) = c(H, E),   
 EHIS:  c(H, E) = c(E, H). 
The results obtained by Crupi et al. point that in case of confirmation 
only HS, HIS and EHIS are the desirable properties. In case of 
disconfirmation, they favor HS, EIS and IS properties, finding all other 
symmetries as unattractive. The results obtained by Crupi et al. concur with 
Eells and Fitelson in case of confirmation.  
The argumentation presented both in the work of Eells and Fitelson, and 
of Crupi et al. is based on understanding Bayesian confirmation as a 
generalization of logical entailment. The counterexample they use in [7] to 
rule out evidence symmetry is based on a conclusively confirmatory rule: if a 
randomly drawn card is the seven of spades, then the card is black. They 
remark that knowing that we have drawn the seven of spades is a much 
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stronger evidence for confirming the conclusion than the negated evidence, 
i.e., knowing that the drawn card is not the seven of spades, is for 
disconfirming the same conclusion. Thus, according to Eells and Fitelson, the 
equality in evidence symmetry is found unattractive, i.e., for some situation 
c(H, E) ≠ c(H, E)).  
However, since boiling the considerations down to entailment or 
refutation is, in our opinion, unwarranted in case of confirmation measures, 
we reconsidered the symmetry properties in the light of strong Bayesian 
confirmation [23]. The analysis brought us to the conclusion that there is no 
need to consider the cases of confirmation and disconfirmation separately like 
Crupi et al. did., and that only HS, ES and EHS are desirable symmetry 
properties. 
First of all, let us observe that in the strong Bayesian perspective both 
confirmation and disconfirmation are based on the consideration of Pr(H|E) 
and Pr(H|E). The highest confirmation is obtained when Pr(H|E) = 0 and 
Pr(H|E) = 1, whereas the highest disconfirmation, occurs when Pr(H|E) = 1 
and Pr(H|E) = 0. Thus, we argued in [23] to consider the symmetry properties 
together for cases of confirmation and disconfirmation as they both consider 
passing from Pr(H|E) to Pr(H|E). 
To recall our argumentation for or against particular symmetry properties 
[23], let us use an exemplary scenario 3 from Table 4, where the values from 
contingency table of E3 and H3 are: a3=100, b3=99, c3=0, d3=1, |U|=200 and 
apply it for showing that evidence symmetry is desirable. Let us observe, that 
for c(H3, E3) we have that Pr(H3|E3)=0.99 and Pr(H3|E3)=1, which gives us a 
1% increase of confirmation. On the other hand, for c(H3, E3) we get 
Pr(H3|E3)=1 and Pr(H3|E3)=0.99, which results in 1% decrease of 
confirmation. Thus, clearly the confirmation of a rule E3H3 should be of the 
same value but of the opposite sign as the confirmation of a E3H3 rule. 
Therefore, we can conclude that c(H3, E3) = c(H3, E3)), i.e., evidence 
symmetry, is desirable. 
The considerations for other symmetry properties can be conducted 
analogously. Our results, i.e., seeing HS, ES and EHS as desirable, differ from 
what Eells and Fitelson [7], and Crupi et al. [6] advocated for because they 
treat the entailment of the conclusion by the premise as the maximal 
confirmation, whereas we consider the increase of confirmation when passing 
from the absence of the premise (E) to its presence (E).  
 
Now, let us present and discuss possible behaviors of confirmation 
measures monotonic in the four perspectives, with respect to the above 
symmetries. 
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Theorem 6. Consider a confirmation measure csmB(H, E) strictly monotonic 
in the Bayesian perspective. The following statements hold: 
1) there are no confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy ES; 
2) there exist confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy HS; 
3) there are no confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy EIS; 
4) there are no confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy HIS; 
5) there exist confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy IS;  
6) there are no confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy EHS; 
7) there exist confirmation measures csmB(H, E) that satisfy EHIS. 
Moreover, if csmB(H, E) satisfies one among HS, IS and EHIS, it cannot satisfy 
any of the remaining two symmetry properties. Finally, there are confirmation 
measures csmB(H, E) that do not satisfy any symmetry property.  
 
 
Observe that on the basis of Theorem 6 we can classify confirmation 
measures strictly monotonic in the Bayesian perspective in four exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive classes: 
 confirmation measures csmB(H, E) satisfying symmetry property HS, 
such as  
csmB(H, E) = Pr(𝐻|𝐸) − Pr(𝐻), 
 confirmation measures csmB(H, E) satisfying symmetry property IS, 
such as  
csmB(H, E) = 
 
  )Pr(|Pr
)Pr(|Pr
HEH
HEH


, 
 confirmation measures csmB(H, E) satisfying symmetry property EHIS, 
such as  
csmB(H, E) = 
 
  )Pr(|Pr2
)Pr(|Pr
HEH
HEH


, 
 confirmation measures csmB(H, E) satisfying no symmetry property, 
such as  
csmB(H, E) =    HEH Pr|Pr  . 
 
Theorem 7. Consider a confirmation measure csmSB(H, E)  strictly monotonic 
in the strong Bayesian perspective. For any symmetry property there are 
confirmation measures csmSB(H, E) satisfying it. Moreover, there are 
confirmation measures csmSB(H, E) that satisfy all symmetry properties.  
 
Continuing our discussion on the relationship between measures 
monotonic in different perspectives and different symmetries, let us now 
introduce some new definitions and lemmas that, besides being interesting per 
se, are useful in proving the following theorems: Theorem 9 and Theorem 10.  
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Definition 2. Given a confirmation measure c(H, E), we say that:  
 c(H, E) is monotonic in the converse Bayesian perspective if there 
exists f:[0,1]×[0,1]→ non-decreasing with the first argument and 
non-increasing with the second argument, with f(x,x) = 0 for all 
x[0,1], such that c(H,E) =− f(Pr(H|¬E), Pr(H)), 
 c(H, E) is monotonic in the converse likelihoodist perspective if there 
exists f:[0,1]×[0,1]→ non-decreasing with the first argument and 
non-increasing with the second argument with f(x,x) = 0 for all 
x[0,1], such that c(H,E) =− f(Pr(E|¬H), Pr(E)). 
 
Let us observe that the converse Bayesian perspective and the converse 
likelihoodist perspective express that E confirms H since 
 Pr(H) > Pr(H|¬E) and  
 Pr(E) > Pr(E|¬H), respectively, 
are logically equivalent (as the other above considered perspectives of 
confirmation) to Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). 
Indeed, since Pr(H|E) > Pr(H) is logically equivalent to 
Pr(H|E) > Pr(H|¬E), we get 
Pr(H) =Pr(H|E) Pr(E) +Pr(H|¬E) (1- Pr(E)) 
> 
Pr(H|¬E) Pr(E) +Pr(H|¬E) (1- Pr(E))= 
Pr(H|¬E). 
Analogously, since Pr(H|E) > Pr(H) is equivalent to Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|¬H), 
we get 
Pr(E) = Pr(E|H) Pr(H) +Pr(E|¬H) (1- Pr(H)) 
> 
Pr(E|¬H) Pr(H) +Pr(E|¬H) (1- Pr(H))= Pr(E|¬H). 
 
To provide an interpretation for the converse Bayesian perspective and 
the converse likelihoodist perspectives of confirmation let us use again the 
example, in which the premise E is the evidence that a patient suffered from a 
fever and the conclusion H reflects that the patient had a flu. Then: 
 in case of converse Bayesian perspective of confirmation, if flu is 
more probable without knowing whether the fever occurred or not 
than knowing that there is not fever, then fever confirms flu, 
 in case of converse likelihoodist perspective of confirmation, if fever 
is more probable without knowing whether the flu occurred or not 
than knowing that there is not flu, then fever confirms flu. 
 
 28 
Theorem 8. A confirmation measure c(H,E) = f(PrL, PrR) being strictly 
monotonic in the converse Bayesian or the converse likelihoodist perspective 
is not strictly monotonic in the other perspectives.   
 
 
Given a confirmation measure c(H, E), let us observe that applying any 
of the transformations related to the symmetries 
X{ES,HS,EIS,HIS,IS,EHS,EHIS} we get another confirmation measure 
cX(H, E). For example, considering confirmation measure  
D(H, E) = Pr(H|E)−Pr(H) 
and applying the transformation related to the IS symmetry we get 
DES(H, E) = Pr(E|H)−Pr(E)= M(H, E).  
 
Lemma 1.  If c(H, E) is a confirmation measure monotonic in the 
perspective P, then cX(H, E) is monotonic in the perspective showed in Table 
6, where P{Bayesian (B), strong Bayesian (SB), likelihoodist (L), strong 
likelihoodist (SL), converse Bayesian (CB), converse likelihoodist (CL)}, 
X{ES,HS,EIS,HIS,IS,EHS,EHIS}.  
Table 6. Transformation of perspectives of confirmation measures after 
negation and/or inversion of evidence E and hypothesis H  
X \P B SB L SL CB CL 
ES CB SB L SL B CL 
HS B SB CL SL CB L 
EIS L SL CB SB CL  B 
HIS CL SL B SB L CB 
IS L SL B SB CL CB 
EHS CB SB CL SL B L 
EHIS CL SL CB SB L B 
 
Observe that Lemma 1 says that the six perspectives of confirmation we have 
considered from the viewpoint of monotonicity are exhaustive, because no 
other new perspective of confirmation measures can be build up by 
transformations of confirmation measures related to symmetry properties. 
 
Lemma 2. For any transformation cX(H, E) of c(H, E), where 
X{ES,HS,EIS,HIS,IS,EHS,EHIS}, there exists an inverse transformation X-1 
such that      .,,,
11
EHcEHcEHc XXXX 

   
More precisely, we have: 
 ES-1=ES, 
 HS-1=HS, 
 29 
 EIS-1=HIS, 
 HIS-1=EIS, 
 IS-1=IS, 
 EHS-1=EHS, 
 EHIS-1=EHIS.  
 
Lemma 3. Given confirmation measures c(H, E) and c1(H, E) and 
X,Y{ES,HS,EIS,HIS,IS,EHS,EHIS}, such that c(H, E)=  EHc X ,1 , 
confirmation measure c1(H, E) satisfies symmetry property Y, that is c1(H, E)=
 EHcY ,1 , if and only if confirmation measure c(H, E) satisfies property 
XYX-1, that is c(H, E)=  EHc XYX ,
1
.   
 
 
Using Lemma 3 and the results of Theorem 6 concerning confirmation 
measures strictly monotonic in the Bayesian perspective, we can easily find 
analogous results for confirmation measures strictly monotonic in the 
likelihoodist, converse Bayesian and converse likelihoodist perspectives. 
Moreover, the results of Theorem 7 can be extended from confirmation 
measures strictly monotonic in the strong Bayesian perspective to 
confirmation measures strictly monotonic in the strong likelihoodist 
perspective.  
 
Theorem 9. Consider a confirmation measure  
 csmL(H, E)  strictly monotonic in the likelihoodist perspective , i.e., 
being strictly increasing with respect to Pr(E|H) and strictly 
decreasing with respect to Pr(E), 
 csmCB(H, E)  strictly monotonic in the converse Bayesian perspective, 
i.e., being strictly decreasing with respect to Pr(H|¬E) and strictly 
increasing with respect to Pr(H), 
 csmCL(H, E)  strictly monotonic in the converse likelihoodist 
perspective, i.e., being strictly decreasing with respect to Pr(E|¬H) 
and strictly increasing with respect to Pr(E). 
We have that: 
1) there exist confirmation measures csmL(H, E) and csmCL(H, E) that 
satisfy ES, while there are no confirmation measures csmCB(H, E)  that 
satisfy ES,   
2) there exist confirmation measures csmCB(H, E) that satisfy HS, while 
there are no confirmation measures csmL(H, E) and csmCL(H, E)  that 
satisfy HS; 
3) there are no confirmation measures csmL(H, E), csmCB(H, E) and 
csmCL(H, E) that satisfy EIS; 
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4) there are no confirmation measures csmL(H, E), csmCB(H, E) and 
csmCL(H, E) that satisfy HIS; 
5) there exist confirmation measures csmL(H, E), csmCB(H, E) and 
csmCL(H, E) that satisfy IS;  
6) there are no confirmation measures csmL(H, E), csmCB(H, E) and 
csmCL(H, E) that satisfy EHS; 
7) there exist confirmation measures csmL(H, E), csmCB(H, E) and 
csmCL(H, E) that satisfy EHIS. 
Moreover, if csmCB(H, E)  (csmL(H, E) or csmCL(H, E))  satisfies one among HS, 
IS and EHIS (one among ES, IS and EHIS), it cannot satisfy any of the 
remaining two symmetry properties. Finally, there are confirmation measures 
csmL(H, E), csmCB(H, E) and csmCL(H, E) that do not satisfy any symmetry 
property.  
 
 
Observe that on the basis of Theorem 9 we can classify confirmation 
measures csmL(H, E) strictly monotonic in the likelihoodist perspective in four 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive classes: 
 confirmation measures csmL(H, E) satisfying symmetry property ES, 
such as  
csmL(H, E) = Pr(𝐸|𝐻) − Pr(𝐸), 
 confirmation measures csmL(H, E) satisfying symmetry property IS, 
such as  
csmL(H, E) = 
 
  )Pr(|Pr
)Pr(|Pr
EHE
EHE


, 
 confirmation measures csmL(H, E) satisfying symmetry property EHIS, 
such as  
csmL(H, E) = 
 
  )Pr(|Pr2
)Pr(|Pr
EHE
EHE


, 
 confirmation measures csmL(H, E) satisfying no symmetry property, 
such as  
csmL(H, E) =    EHE Pr|Pr  . 
 
Moreover, on the basis of Theorem 9, we can classify confirmation measures 
csmCB(H, E) strictly monotonic in the converse Bayesian perspective in four 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive classes: 
 confirmation measures csmCB(H, E) satisfying symmetry property HS, 
such as  
csmCB(H, E) = Pr(𝐻) −Pr(𝐻|¬𝐸), 
 confirmation measures csmCB(H, E) satisfying symmetry property IS, 
such as  
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csmCB(H, E) = 
 
 EHH
EHH


|Pr)Pr(
|Pr)Pr(
, 
 confirmation measures csmCB(H, E) satisfying symmetry property 
EHIS, such as  
csmCB(H, E) = 
 
 EHH
EHH


|Pr)Pr(2
|Pr)Pr(
, 
 confirmation measures csmCB(H, E) satisfying no symmetry property, 
such as  
csmCB(H, E) =    EHH  |PrPr . 
 
Finally, on the basis of Theorem 9, we can classify also confirmation 
measures csmCL(H, E) strictly monotonic in the converse likelihoodist 
perspective in four exhaustive and mutually exclusive classes: 
 confirmation measures csmCL(H, E) satisfying symmetry property ES, 
such as  
csmCL(H, E) = Pr(𝐸) −Pr(𝐸|¬𝐻), 
 confirmation measures csmCL(H, E) satisfying symmetry property IS, 
such as  
csmCL(H, E) = 
 
 HEE
HEE


|Pr)Pr(
|Pr)Pr(
, 
 confirmation measures csmCL(H, E) satisfying symmetry property 
EHIS, such as  
csmCL(H, E) = 
 
 HEE
HEE


|Pr)Pr(2
|Pr)Pr(
, 
 confirmation measures csmCL(H, E) satisfying no symmetry property, 
such as  
csmCL(H, E) =    HEE  |PrPr . 
 
 
Theorem 10. Consider a confirmation measure csmSL(H, E)  strictly 
monotonic in the strong likelihoodist perspective, i.e., being strictly increasing 
with respect to Pr(E|H) and strictly decreasing with respect to Pr(¬E| H). For 
any symmetry property there are confirmation measures csmSL(H, E) satisfying 
it. Moreover, there are confirmation measures csmSL(H, E) that satisfy all 
symmetry properties.  
 
 
Let us observe that the hypothesis of strict monotonicity in the above 
theorems cannot be removed, because, indeed, there exist confirmation 
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measures that are monotonic, but not strictly monotonic, in all the 
perspectives and satisfy all the symmetry properties. This is the case of  
confirmation measure cU(H, E) presented below, which is “universally” 
monotonic in all the six perspectives: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is easy to see that one can write cU(H,E)=f(PrL, PrR) in terms of left- and 
right-hand side probabilities PrL and PrR of any of the six perspectives as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
  
5. Selected measures of confirmation 
Measures that possess the property of confirmation defined as Bayesian 
confirmation, strong Bayesian confirmation, likelihoodist confirmation, strong 
likelihoodist confirmation, converse Bayesian confirmation or converse 
likelihoodist confirmation are referred to as confirmation measures or 
measures of confirmation. Sometimes an adjective comes into the denotation, 
e.g., Bayesian confirmation measures.  
Due to the logical equivalence of all the analyzed perspectives of 
confirmation we can conclude that a measure satisfying the Bayesian 
confirmation must also satisfy strong Bayesian confirmation, likelihoodist 
confirmation, etc., as long as we exclude undefined values. It is thus 
legitimate to call such measures simply measures of confirmation (or 
confirmation measures).  
Such measures quantify the degree to which the premise E provides 
“support for or against” the conclusion H [12], the degree to which E 
confirms/disconfirms H. By using confirmation measures in the rule 
evaluation process, we aim at limiting the set of rules proposed to the user 
[40]. Let us observe, that the constraints put on a measure by any of the 









.0 if  1
,0 if    0
,0 if     1
)(
bcad
bcad
bcad
H,EcU









.PrPr if  1
,PrPr if    0
,PrPr if     1
)(
RL
RL
RL
H,EcU
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perspectives of confirmation are that a measure assigns positive values in the 
situation when confirmation occurs, negative values in case of 
disconfirmation, and zero otherwise. In consequence of that many alternative, 
non-equivalent measures of confirmation have been defined. Here we select 
for further analysis the normalized measures shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Selected measures of confirmation 
𝐷(𝐻, 𝐸) = Pr(𝐻|𝐸) − Pr(𝐻) =
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑐
−
𝑎 + 𝑏
|𝑈|
 [4] 
𝑀(𝐻, 𝐸) = Pr(𝐸|𝐻) − Pr(𝐸) =
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑏
−
𝑎 + 𝑐
|𝑈|
 [31] 
𝑆(𝐻, 𝐸) = Pr(𝐻|𝐸) − Pr(𝐻|¬𝐸) =
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑐
−
𝑏
𝑏 + 𝑑
 [5] 
𝑁(𝐻, 𝐸) = Pr(𝐸|𝐻) − Pr(𝐸|¬𝐻) =
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑏
−
𝑐
𝑐 + 𝑑
 [33] 
𝐶(𝐻, 𝐸) = Pr(𝐸𝐻) − Pr(𝐸)𝑃𝑟(𝐻) =
𝑎
|𝑈|
−
(𝑎 + 𝑐)(𝑎 + 𝑏)
|𝑈|2
 [4] 
𝐹(𝐻, 𝐸) =
Pr(𝐸|𝐻) − Pr⁡(𝐸|¬𝐻)
Pr(𝐸|𝐻) + Pr⁡(𝐸|¬𝐻)
=
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
𝑎𝑑 + 𝑏𝑐 + 2𝑎𝑐
 [25] 
𝐹′(𝐻, 𝐸) =
Pr(𝐻|𝐸) − Pr⁡(𝐻|¬𝐸)
Pr(𝐻|𝐸) + Pr⁡(𝐻|¬𝐸)
=
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
𝑎𝑑 + 𝑏𝑐 + 2𝑎𝑏
  
𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸) =
{
 
 
 
 Pr(𝐻|𝐸) − Pr(𝐻)
1 − Pr(𝐻)
=
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
(𝑎 + 𝑐)(𝑐 + 𝑑)
 in case of confirmation
Pr(𝐻|𝐸) − Pr(𝐻)
Pr(𝐻)
=
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
(𝑎 + 𝑐)(𝑎 + 𝑏)
 in case of disconfirmation
 [6] 
𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸) =
{
 
 
 
 Pr(𝐻) − Pr(𝐻|¬𝐸)
Pr(𝐻)
=
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
(𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑏 + 𝑑)
 in case of confirmation
Pr(𝐻) − Pr(𝐻|¬𝐸)
1 − Pr(𝐻)
=
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
(𝑏 + 𝑑)(𝑐 + 𝑑)
 in case of disconfirmation
 [22] 
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𝑐1(𝐻, 𝐸) =
{
 
 
 
 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of confirmation when c = 0
𝛼𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of confirmation when c > 0
𝛼𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of disconfirmation when a > 0
−𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of disconfirmation when a=0
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒⁡𝛼 ≥ 0, 𝛽 ≥ 0⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1 
[22] 
𝑐2(𝐻, 𝐸) =
{
 
 
 
 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of confirmation when b = 0
𝛼𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of confirmation when b > 0
𝛼𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of disconfirmation when d > 0
−𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸)  in case of disconfirmation when d=0
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒⁡𝛼 ≥ 0, 𝛽 ≥ 0⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1 
[22] 
𝑐3(𝐻, 𝐸) = {
𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸)𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸) in case of confirmation
−𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸)𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸) in case of disconfirmation
 [22] 
𝑐4(𝐻, 𝐸) = {
𝑚𝑖𝑛⁡(𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸), 𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸)) in case of confirmation
⁡𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡(𝐴(𝐻, 𝐸), 𝑍(𝐻, 𝐸)) in case of disconfirmation
 [22] 
𝑄(𝐻, 𝐸) =
𝑎𝑑 − 𝑏𝑐
𝑎𝑑 + 𝑏𝑐
 [43] 
 
The measures gathered in Table 7, can also be grouped according to their 
monotonicity with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities of different 
perspectives of confirmation. For example, measures D(H,E) and Z(H,E) are 
monotonic in the Bayesian perspective, measure M(H,E) in the likelihoodist 
perspective, measure S(H,E) in the strong Bayesian perspective, whereas 
measures N(H,E) and F(H,E) in the strong likelihoodist perspective.  
Let us also observe that the considered measures can be put in some kind of 
couples according to their definition being inspired by the Bayesian (strong 
Bayesian) or likelihoodist (strong likelihoodist) perspective. Measure 
D(H,E) = Pr(H|E)Pr(H) can be regarded as a Bayesian counterpart of the 
likelihoodist measure M(H,E) = Pr(E|H)Pr(E). In the same way, we can join 
measures S(H,E) and N(H,E). Though measure  
F(H, E)= [Pr(E|H)−Pr(E|H)]/[Pr(E|H)+Pr(E|H)]  does not have any 
popular counterpart, it can paired with newly formulated  
F’(H, E) = [Pr(H|E)−Pr(H|E)]/[Pr(H|E)+Pr(H|E)]. Let us also recall that 
measure F(H, E) is ordinally equivalent to the log likelihood ratio measure 
L(H, E)= log[Pr(E|H)/[Pr(E|H)], as well as measure F’(H,E) is ordinally 
equivalent to the following Bayesian counterpart of the log likelihood ratio 
measure B(H, E)= log[Pr(H|E)/[Pr(H|E)] . Measures C(H,E), c3(H,E) and 
c4(H,E) can be regarded as “self adjoint”.  
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Application of confirmation measures (e.g. all measures from Table 7 
except for measure C(H,E)) for evaluation of rules induced from datasets may 
lead to obtaining undefined values in particular cases, e.g., for any rule 
characterized by a contingency table with a+c = 0 an undefined value of 
measure D(H,E) is obtained. Such situations are inconvenient and 
troublesome for data analysts and are generally undesirable. In such situations 
a measure simply cannot evaluate a rule. In our opinion, the more often 
undefined values can occur for a measure, the less useful the measure is.  
Let us observe, however, that taking advantage of the general definition 
of the confirmation (2), we can avoid situations when for a particular measure, 
the answer is undefined. Since the condition ad−bc = 0 requires that a 
measure obtains value 0, we can assume that any measure (despite its actual 
definition) defaults to 0 whenever ad−bc = 0. This way, we would not even 
calculate the value of a measure but basing on the fact that ad−bc = 0 assign it 
to  0. Such an approach would allow us to eliminate some undefined values, 
e.g., for a contingency table where a = c = 0, we would obtain an undefined 
value of measure D(H,E) (the denominator would be equal to 0), however 
using the general definition of confirmation, we see that a = c = 0 results in 
the situation of neutrality because ad−bc = 0, and thus instead of an undefined 
value we could say that D(H,E) states neutrality. 
Let us stress that the above proposition is inspired by practical 
experiments, in which dealing with undefined values perturbs the rule 
evaluation procedure. On the other hand, however, valuable procedures of 
rule induction form rules on the basis of existence of positive examples 
(and/or counterexamples) in the dataset. In such cases, many of the undefined 
situations would be avoided as the procedure would not even create rules for 
which particular measures would be undefined.  
5.1. Properties of selected confirmation measures 
Having established the list of desirable properties of confirmation 
measures, let us summarize the analyses of measures with respect to them. 
Table 8 and Table 9 gather the results. Measures S(H,E), N(H,E), c3(H,E) and 
c4(H,E) are the ones which possess all the properties discussed in this paper 
which are desirable (i.e. monotonicity M, weak Ex1, weak L and 
maximality/minimality, HS, ES and EHS) and are thus recommended for 
finding meaningful rules. It is interesting to note that S(H,E) is monotonic in 
the strong Bayesian perspective of and N(H,E) in the strong likelihoodist 
perspective, while c3(H,E) and c4(H,E) are obtained combining two 
confirmation measures, Z(H,E) and A(H,E), monotonic in the Bayesian and in 
the converse Bayesian perspective. Notice that we considered also 
confirmation measure F’(H,E) that can be interpreted as a strong Bayesian 
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counterpart of the strong likelihoodist confirmation measure F(H,E). To the 
best of our knowledge F’(H,E) is a new measure and it has not been 
considered before. We also included in our considerations Yule’s Q(H,E) 
because it satisfies many interesting properties. 
 
Table 8. Properties of selected measures of confirmation 
Confir- 
mation 
mea- 
sure 
mono- 
toni- 
city M 
Ex1 Ex1’ 
weak  
Ex1 
L L’ 
weak 
L 
maxi- 
mality/ 
mini- 
mality 
mono- 
tonicity  
in the  
perspective 
D(H, E) no no no no no no no no Bayesian 
M(H, E) no no no no no no no no likelihoodist 
S(H, E) yes no no yes no no yes yes 
strong 
Bayesian 
N(H, E) yes no no yes no no yes yes 
strong 
likelihoodist 
C(H, E) no no no no no no no no  
F(H, E) yes yes no yes yes no yes no 
strong 
likelihoodist 
F’(H, E) yes no yes yes no yes yes no 
strong 
Bayesian 
Z(H, E) yes yes no yes yes no yes no Bayesian 
A(H, E) yes no yes yes no yes yes no 
converse 
Bayesian 
c1(H, E) yes yes no yes no no yes yes  
c2(H, E) yes no yes yes no no yes yes  
c3(H, E) yes no no yes no no yes yes  
c4(H, E) yes no no yes no no yes yes  
Q(H,E) yes no no yes yes yes yes no  
 
Table 9. Symmetry properties of selected measures of confirmation 
Confirmation 
measure 
hypothesis 
symmetry 
(HS) 
evidence 
symmetry  
(ES) 
evidence-
hypothesis 
symmetry (EHS) 
D(H, E) yes no no 
M(H, E) no yes no 
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S(H, E) yes yes yes 
N(H, E) yes yes yes 
C(H, E) yes yes yes 
F(H, E) yes no no 
F’(H,E) no yes no 
Z(H, E) yes no no 
A(H, E) yes no no 
c1(H, E) yes no no 
c2(H, E) yes no no 
c3(H, E) yes yes yes 
c4(H, E) yes yes yes 
Q(H,E) yes yes yes 
6. Conclusions 
Adopting different perspectives for probabilistic relationships between rule’s 
premise and conclusion, one arrives at six formulations of the confirmation 
concept: four of them (that we call  Bayesian confirmation, strong Bayesian 
confirmation, likelihoodist confirmation and strong likelihoodist 
confirmation) are well known in the literature, while the other two (that we 
call converse Bayesian confirmation and converse likelihoodist confirmation) 
have been introduced in this paper. As observed in [12], [28] with respect to 
the four classically considered perspectives, and in Section 4.4 of this paper 
with respect to the two new perspectives, all these perspectives are logically 
equivalent. Moreover, there exists a general definition of confirmation, 
expressed in terms of a contingency table rather than in terms of probabilities, 
that is common for all of them [16]. The general definition has the advantage 
of being always defined, as opposed to the other considered formulations.  
In this paper, we focused our attention on linking qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the concept of confirmation. To this end, we 
introduced an important property of monotonicity of a confirmation measure 
with respect to left- and right-hand side probabilities of particular perspectives 
and we checked this property for selected measures. This led us to a 
conclusion that the six perspectives, although logically equivalent, involve 
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different types of monotonicity that differentiate particular confirmation 
measures. This is due to the observed fact that a measure being strictly 
monotonic in one perspective is not strictly monotonic in the other 
perspectives. We have also performed a thorough analysis of several other 
properties that confirmation measures may possess. They include 
monotonicity M, Ex1, Ex1’, weak Ex1, L, L’, weak L, maximality/minimality 
and symmetry properties. Moreover, we discovered and proved what 
relationships there are between those properties and the monotonicity of a 
measure in a given perspective. In particular, investigating symmetry 
properties, we introduced the two new perspectives of converse Bayesian 
confirmation and converse likelihoodist confirmation showing also that 
together with the other four previous perspectives they are exhaustive with 
respect to transformations of confirmation measure related to symmetry 
properties. 
Analysis of chosen confirmation measures with respect to the desirable 
properties showed that measures S(H,E), N(H,E), c3(H,E), c4(H,E) are 
particularly valuable.  
Further research will focus on experimental exploitation of these 
conclusions with respect to both association and decision rules.  
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